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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS CABRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050963-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a restitution award imposed as part of a sentence on a conviction of 
two counts of DUI, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(3)(a)(ii) (West 2004),1 in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to consider 
the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did defendant have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his restitution 
hearing? 
1
 Renumbered Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(l)(b)(i) (West 2004). 
Standard of Review: "[Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that [this 
Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Curry, 2006 UT App 390, ^ f 5, — P.3d --- (citation 
omitted). 
Issue 2: Assuming arguendo that defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
at the restitution hearing, did he implicitly waive it when he appeared unrepresented at the 
hearing after the judge explicitly warned him that the hearing would go forward on the 
scheduled date and defendant committed to the judge that he would retain private counsel for 
the hearing or, if he was unable to, notify the court beforehand? 
Standard of Review: Whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Factual questions are 
reviewed for correctness while the trial court's factual findings may be reversed only if 
clearly erroneous. State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 23, 137 P.3d 716 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in not sua sponte determining whether the victim was 
contributorily negligent where there was no credible evidence that anyone but defendant was 
at fault for the accident? 
Standard of Review: Unpreserved claims raised for the first time on appeal will be 
reviewed for plain error. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1? [^ 41? 63 P.3d 731 ("We have often 
stated that issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.. . unless 
the petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error5 occurred or 'exceptional circumstances9 exist.") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 
Issue 4: Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not arguing that the victim was 
contributorily negligent? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time 
on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
Issue 5: Was the trial court correct in imposing restitution and rejecting defendant's 
claim that the restitution order was not dischargeable in bankruptcy? 
Standard of Review: "We will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution unless the 
'trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.'" State v. 
Robinson, 860 P.2d 979,980-81 (UtahApp. 1993) (quoting State v. Twitchell,S32P.2d&66, 
868 (Utah App.1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional amendment and statutes are relevant to this appeal and 
reproduced below or attached as Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (West 2004) (Crime Victims Restitution Act); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (West 2004) (comparative negligence). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with two counts of DUI with serious bodily 
injuries, both third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004); 
operating a vehicle without insurance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-12a-302 (West 2004); driving left of center, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53 (West 2004); and driving without a license, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 (West 2004). R. 1-3. 
On September 30,2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered guilty pleas 
to two counts of class A misdemeanor DUIs with injuries. R. 48-55. 
Defendant was sentenced to 365 days in jail, but the court suspended all but 60 days. 
R. 66. The court also imposed a $1,400 fine and $80,000 in restitution. R. 67. The court 
ordered that half of defendant's net income be paid toward restitution. R. 68 
On July 8,2005, the court held a restitution hearing and later issued an order assessing 
$102,000 in restitution. R. 351-60, 410. 
On August 10, 2005, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 361 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"A lot of head trauma " 
Rebecca Mecham was making a left turn onto a two-lane road when a pair of 
headlights suddenly appeared in her lane, coming straight toward her. R. 410:6. 
4 
"All I saw was headlights/' she said. "After I made the left-hand turn[,] I saw that 
behind that car a car swerved out and around it and was at that point headed at me in my 
lane." Id. 
In an effort to avoid the oncoming vehicle, Mecham drove her truck off the road to 
her right and onto the shoulder. At that point, her engine stalled and she came to a complete 
stop just before the oncoming vehicle struck her truck, causing it to roll. Id.; R. 3. She later 
learned that she was taken by helicopter to LDS Hospital where she was unconscious for 
three days and underwent several surgeries and treatment for a fractured pelvis, injured ankle 
and "a lot of head trauma." R. 410:7. The passenger in her car, a 13-year-old girl, suffered 
"substantial" head injuries. R. 3. 
"A lot" of drinking 
The car that struck Mecham was driven by 24-year-old Nicholas Joshua Cabrera, the 
defendant in this case, who, by his own estimate, had been drinking "a lot." R. 3. Testing 
confirmed defendant's assessment: A blood alcohol level of .16—twice the legal limit. Id. 
Defendant retained counsel and soon struck a plea deal. Defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to two reduced charges of class A misdemeanor DUI with injuries in exchange for 
dismissal of other charges. R. 48 (Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea, 
hereinafter "Plea Statement"). In the Plea Statement, defendant admitted that he "operated a 
motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol to a degree that I could not safely do so, 
injuring two people." R. 49. 
5 
Restitution wrangles 
As part of defendant's sentence, the trial court initially imposed restitution of $80,000 
on behalf of Mecham. R. 67. The court stated that the exact amount of restitution would be 
determined during later review, but that defendant must begin turning over half of his net 
income each month until full restitution was paid. R. 68. 
On March 7, 2005, after defendant had served his 60-day jail sentence, he filed a 
memorandum challenging the restitution award. R. 78-84. Defendant claimed that he had 
filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and that 
his debts had been discharged a year earlier. R. 79. Defendant asserted that the State had not 
made any claims in the bankruptcy proceedings and was, therefore, barred from recovery. R. 
80. Defendant also claimed that the victims had been compensated for their injuries and 
expenses by insurance and that awarding restitution would constitute a "windfall,." R. 81. 
The State responded by pointing out that restitution awards, and particularly those 
ordered to compensate victims of drunk driving, are exempted from discharge under federal 
bankruptcy law. R. 94. The State also noted that although there had been some insurance 
payments to the 13-year-old girl who was injured, Mecham is uninsured and her medical 
bills have not been covered. R. 95. Accordingly, the State was only seeking restitution for 
2
 In fact, the State was not listed as a debtor in defendant's petition and never received 
notice of the petition. R. 410:22. 
6 
Mecham, id., and in April 2005, the State submitted 60 pages of medical statements for 
Mecham's hospitalization, treatment, and other expenses totaling $143,158.80. R. 192. 
On March 8, 2005, the trial court rejected defendant's claim that restitution was 
discharged in bankruptcy. R. 112. Coincidentally, on that same day, the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah ruled that some forms of restitution were 
dischargeable. See Troff v. State of Utah (In re Jason Derek Troff), Bankruptcy Case No. 03-
21840/Adv. Proc. No. 04-02491 (Bankr.D.Utah), R. 336-41 Addendum B. The bankruptcy 
court held that in order to be exempt from discharge, a restitution order must (1) be for the 
benefit of the State and (2) not compensate an actual pecuniary loss. R. 278-80. Because the 
State acknowledged that amounts collected from Troff were for the benefit of the victim and 
not punitive, the bankruptcy court ruled that the restitution order in that case did not meet the 
two criteria and, therefore, was dischargeable. R. 281. 
Upon learning of the Tro^decision, the trial court sua sponte decided to reverse its 
earlier ruling and instead ruled that the restitution award against defendant had been 
discharged in bankruptcy. R. 195. "I reluctantly do that," the court stated, "because I really 
feel that the rights of the victims are been [sic] disregarded in this kind of a situation because 
of that ruling, but I don't want to put the court in any position where we are not following 
bankruptcy precedence especially from this district, this area." R. 307. 
The State moved for reconsideration, R. 286-304, and the trial court again reversed 
itself, ruling that the restitution was exempted from discharge. R. 357. In August 2005, the 
7 
United States Court for the District of Utah reversed the bankruptcy judge's ruling in Troff 
In re Troff, 329 B.R. 85 (D. Utah 2005). The federal district court held that restitution orders 
were exempt because they serve rehabilitative purposes and therefore are primarily for the 
benefit of the State, not individuals. Id. at 99. 
No counsel 
After ruling that the restitution award against defendant was not discharged, the Utah 
court scheduled a restitution hearing for June 17,2005. But the hearing had to be continued 
when defendant appeared without counsel and requested a continuance because "counsel was 
newly retained, and therefore, could not be present today." R. 344. The court rescheduled 
the hearing for July 8, 2005, but explicitly advised defendant that if he appeared again 
without counsel, the hearing would still go forward. R. 410:2-3. Defendant was told to 
contact the court if he was unable to retain counsel and the court would consider whether 
counsel should be appointed. R. 410:1-2. 
On July 8, 2005, petitioner once again appeared without counsel. R. 410. The court 
asked defendant why he had not retained counsel and defendant replied: "Because 1 couldn't 
come up with the money . . . , it was at the last minute." R. 410:2. The court then asked 
defendant if he had attempted to notify the court that he had not retained counsel. Id. 
Defendant said he had not. Id. As promised, the court proceeded with the hearing. Id. 
The court issued an extensive written order outlining findings and conclusions 
concerning restitution. R. 351-60, Addendum C. The court found that complete 
8 
restitution—the amount needed to cover all of Mecham's losses—totaled $201,735.63 in 
medical and hospital expenses, loss of her home and vehicle and lost income. R. 355-56. 
However, out of consideration for defendant's financial resources, the court imposed 
restitution of about half of Mecham's actual losse—$102,000—to be paid in monthly 
installments of $500 beginning in August 2005 and ending in July 2022. R. 356, 359-60. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant had no right to counsel at the restitution hearing because he 
faced no potential incarceration and, therefore, had no liberty interests at stake. 
Assuming arguendo defendant had a right to counsel, he implicitly waived the right by 
appearing at the July 8, 2005, restitution hearing without counsel, even though the trial 
court had explicitly informed him that he must have counsel by that date and that the 
restitution hearing would go forward at that time even if defendant appeared without 
counsel. Defendant agreed to retain counsel by that date, did not notify the court 
beforehand that he had not, and provided no good explanation to the court for his failure 
to do so. Accordingly, defendant, by his conduct, waived his right to counsel. 
Point II: The trial court properly awarded restitution without sua sponte 
determining whether the victim of defendant's drunken driving was partly at fault for the 
accident under comparative negligence principles. Defendant's claim that the court's 
restitution award was improper fails, first, because it was not preserved and defendant has 
not demonstrated plain error, exceptional circumstances or ineffective assistance of 
9 
counsel. Second, even if this Court were to consider the claim, it fails because 
comparative negligence principles do not require apportioning fault to a crime victim 
and, in any event, there was no credible evidence that the victim was in any way at fault 
for the accident. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
WAS NOT VIOLATED BECAUSE HE HAD NO RIGHT TO 
COUSEL AT THE RESTITUTION HEARING; BUT EVEN 
ASSUMING HE DID, THE RIGHT WAS NOT VIOLATED, 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT IMPLICITLY WAIVED IT BY 
COMMITTING TO RETAIN COUNSEL FOR THE HEARING 
AND FAILING TO DO SO. 
Defendant claims the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by 
forcing him to proceed pro se at the restitution hearing. "The trial court erred in failing to 
appoint counsel for [defendant], or in failing to continue the restitution hearing until 
[defendant] could retain counsel." Aplt. Br. at 4. This claim fails, first, because defendant 
had no right to counsel at the restitution hearing and, second, because any right to counsel 
was implicitly waived by defendant's failure to retain counsel, despite his commitment to the 
court that he would do so. 
A, Because Defendant Did Not Face Possible Incarceration at the 
Restitution Hearing, He Had No "Liberty Interest" at Stake and, 
Therefore, No Right to Counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in "criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his 
10 
defence.55 U.S. Const, amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344(1963) 
(stating "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"). A 
defendant has a right to representation at all "critical" stages of the proceedings against him. 
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). A critical stage has been defined to 
include "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." Id.; see also Or em City v. 
Bergstrom, 1999 UT App 350, | 8, 992 P.2d 991 ("[T]he right to counsel for a defendant 
charged with a misdemeanor attaches only if the court determines, pretrial, to impose jail 
time."); State v. Fisk,966 P.2d 860, 863-64 (Utah App. 1998) (preliminary hearing is critical 
stage): State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005,1007 (Utah 1982) ("Sentencing is a critical stage of 
a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel."). 
However, although a defendant has a right to counsel at critical stages, courts have 
held that some proceedings do not require representation by counsel. See, e.g., United States 
v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 919-20, n.7. (10th Cir.1990), ("[A] routine post-conviction pre-
sentence interview is not a 'critical stage' of the proceedings at which a defendant has a 
Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel."); Mogardv. City of Laramie, 32 P.3d 
313, 324 (Wyo. 2001) (administration of sobriety tests not a critical stage). 
11 
Defendant maintains that restitution hearings are "a part of the criminal sentencing 
process, and are thus considered substantial steps in criminal prosecution, wherein 
defendants have the right to counsel." Aplt. Br. at 6. However, no court in Utah, and very 
few in other jurisdictions, have held that restitution hearings implicate a right to counsel. 
Indeed, the two cases cited by defendant are among the only jurisdictions that require 
counsel at restitution proceedings. See State v. Izzolina, 609 N.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Iowa 
2000); Hill v. Bradford, 549 So. 2d 208,210 (Ala. 1990) (cited at Aplt. Br. at 6). Moreover, 
the relevance of those cases is questionable given that they are both premised on a view of 
the right to counsel at sentencing and restitution proceedings that is much broader than that 
accepted by Utah courts. For example, Izzolina's recognition of the right rests largely on 
Iowa's rules of criminal procedure, which "provide an expansive view of a defendant's right 
to court-appointed counsel." State v. Alspach, 554 N.W.2d 882,883 (Iowa 1996).3 Similarly, 
the Bradford court's recognition of a right to counsel at restitution proceedings is premised 
in large part on an Alabama statute expressly guaranteeing the defendant, victims and the 
prosecutor—or their "representatives"—the "right to be present and be heard upon the issuef 
3
 Alspach cites Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(1), which states: "'Every 
defendant who is an indigent person as defined in Iowa Code section 815.9, is entitled to 
have counsel appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceedings from the 
defendant's initial appearance before the magistrate or the court through appeal, including 
probation and parole revocation hearings, unless the defendant waives such appointment.'" 
Id., 554 N.W.2d at 883 (emphasis added by court). 
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restitution " Williams v. State, 506 So.2d 368, 372 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).4 Thus, 
neither Izzolina nor Bradford stand for the proposition that Sixth Amendment requires 
representation at restitution hearings. 
In determining which kinds of judicial proceedings trigger the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, Utah courts look to United States Supreme Court precedent distinguishing 
between proceedings that involve the possibility of incarceration and those that do not. See 
State v. Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, \ 32,111 P.3d 820 (Utah App.) (defendant entitled to 
counsel when a term of incarceration is imposed.), cert, granted, 124 P.3d 634 (Utah 2005). 
Ferguson accords with a long line of Supreme Court cases embracing the "actual 
imprisonment" standard, which hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments "require 
only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the 
State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense." Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,373-74 (1979); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,667 (2002) 
(suspended sentence invokes right to counsel because defendant would be unable to 
challenge the original judgment at later probation revocation hearing); Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972) ("[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may 
4
 "Section 15-18-67, Code of Alabama 1975, provides that the court 'shall hold5 a 
restitution hearing to determine pecuniary loss to a crime victim, at which time '[t]he 
defendant, the victim or victims, or their representatives . . . as well as the district attorney 
shall have the right to be present and be heardupon the issue of restitution...." Williamsy 
506 So.2d at 372 (emphasis added by court). 
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be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he 
was represented by counsel at his trial"). 
In accord with this reasoning, at least one jurisdiction has recognized that because 
restitution hearings "seek[] a punishment less than incarceration, the appointment of counsel 
may not be required." State v. Kendall, 2001 WL 1739450 (Del.Super. 2001), Addendum D. 
Kendell was convicted of an undisclosed crime and had received a sentence thai included 
restitution in an amount to be determined later. Id. at % 1.5 A public defender who had been 
appointed to represent Kendell at the restitution hearing objected, arguing that the 
appointment was beyond the scope of a state statute requiring appointment of counsel only 
for indigent defendants who are "under arrest" or "charged with a crime." Id. In granting 
the public defendant's motion to withdraw, the court made the following observations: 
The outcome of that [restitution] hearing will not deprive the defendant of any 
liberty interest. Upon conviction, the defendant was aware that he would be 
required to pay restitution. A further hearing on that matter merely clarifies an 
aspect of the sentencing. The hearing, itself, is not required by the Court, but 
has been so ordered to protect the defendant's right to present evidence as to 
what he owes. This court sees no issues of due process or fairness in relation 
to the defendant's lack of counsel at the hearing he is requesting. No counsel 
will be appointed. 
Mat^[3 . 
Here, defendant pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of DUI and was sentenced 
to 60 days in jail and ordered to pay $80,000 in restitution. Because of the tlireat of 
5
 Paragraph numbers have been added to the attached copy of Kendell for ease of 
reference. 
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incarceration, defendant clearly had a right to counsel at all critical stages. And, in fact, he 
was represented by counsel throughout the prosecution, including the change-of-plea and 
sentencing hearings. However, at the time of the July 9,2005, restitution hearing, defendant 
had served his full 60 days in jail and was not subject to further incarceration. See R. 64,67 
(sentencing minutes ordering defendant to report for 60-day sentence on December 15, 
2004). In other words, "actual imprisonment" was not a possible outcome from the 
restitution hearing. Thus, under the principles articulated in Shelton, Scott, mdArgersinger, 
defendant was not entitled to counsel at the restitution hearing, even though such hearings 
are a part of sentencing, because any sentence ultimately imposed could not include 
incarceration. Because there was no "liberty interest" at stake, defendant had no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at the restitution hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
err in allowing defendant to represent himself at that proceeding. 
B. Even Assuming Defendant Had a Right to Counsel at the 
Restitution Hearing, the Right Was Implicitly Waived by 
Defendant's Failure to Keep His Commitment to Retain Counsel 
for the Restitution Hearing. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the 
restitution hearing, he implicitly waived that right when he appeared at the July 8, 2005, 
restitution hearing without counsel, after the trial court had explicitly informed him several 
weeks earlier that he must retain an attorney in time for the hearing and defendant agreed to 
do so. 
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The Sixth Amendment implicitly allows a defendant to waive the right to the 
assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806,818-32 (1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three ways a defendant may waive his right to 
counsel. State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, Tf 27, 137 P.3d 716; accord State v. Houston, 2006. 
2006 UT App 437, —P.3d—. First, a defendant may relinquish his right to counsel by "true 
waiver" through an on-the-record colloquy with the trial court in which he is informed of the 
importance of counsel and still chooses knowingly and voluntarily to proceed pro se. Id. at 
Yli 28-30. Second, a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel through '"extremely dilatory 
conduct5" or abusive behavior, such as physically assaulting counsel." Id. at ffl[ 31-32 
(quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092,1101 (3d Cir.1995)). Finally, a defendant 
may give up his right to counsel through "waiver by conduct" or "implied waiver," which 
occurs when a defendant who has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he continues 
to engage in dilatory tactics continues to misbehave. Id. at f^ 33. However, such a warning 
need not be as extensive as a formal colloquy. United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317,1323 
(10th Cir. 1999) (observing that there are circumstances where a waiver may be considered 
valid absent a formal inquiry where "'the surrounding facts and circumstances, including 
[the defendant's] background and conduct,'" indicate that he "'actually understood his right 
to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel'") (citation omitted). 
16 
Conduct that may constitute implied waiver need not be as "extreme" as that required 
for forfeiture. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ f 33. The defendant can give up the right to counsel 
without actually intending waiver. Id. 
But the defendant must have been warned that continuation of the 
unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver of the right to counsel. As is the 
case in a true waiver situation, the waiver also must be knowing and 
intelligent. In other words, the defendant must have also possessed an 
awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time 
of the implied waiver. 
Id. "Unacceptable conduct" includes a defendant's failure to hire an attorney despite having 
the financial resources to do so. Id. at f^ 35, n.36. "[T]he combination of ability to pay for 
counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at trial. It is waiver by 
conduct." United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1992) (quoted in Pedockie, 
2006 UT 28, *[  35, n.36). In other words, defendants who are able to afford an attorney—i.e., 
are not indigent—are not entitled to appointed counsel. United States v. Enriquez, 106 F.3d 
414 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished decision) ("No violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs 
when a well informed defendant who can afford to do so elects not to retain counsel and 
enters a plea without representation"); United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 899, n.6 
(10th Cir. 1987) (defendant who proceeds pro se despite having resources to procure an 
attorney "will have waived his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment"); accord United 
States v. Terry, 449 F.2d 727, 728-29 (5th Cir 1971) ("'[The defendant] is incorrect in his 
assumption that the Sixth Amendment Rights have been newly wrapped in a climate which 
affords a defendant the right to obtain a delay at his whim and caprice, or to obtain a reversal 
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because he was unable to frustrate justice.'") (quoting United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 
210 (4th Cir. 1968)); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 1958) ("[W]here a 
defendant able to retain counsel has been advised by the court that he must retain counsel by 
a certain reasonable time, and where there is no showing why he has not retained counsel 
within that time, the court may treat his failure to provide for his own defense as a waiver of 
his right to counsel and require such defendant to proceed to trial without an attorney"); 
Coughlin v. State, 842 So.2d 30, 34 (Ala.Crim.App. 2002) ("[I]t is the nonindigent 
defendant's act of appearing at any proceeding without counsel, after having been given a 
reasonable time to retain counsel, that serves as a waiver of his right to counsel 'on the 
record'") (citation omitted); State v. Brzycki, 445 N.W.2d 59 (Wis.App.1989) ("A person not 
qualifying for public defender representation may not, of course, prevent trial by refusing to 
hire counsel."); Fowlkes v. State, 536 A.2d 1149, 1159 (Md. 1988) ("Courts have 
consistently held that the right to.counsel does not give an accused the unfettered right to 
discharge current counsel and demand different counsel shortly before or at trial."). 
In Pedockie, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the aggravated kidnapping conviction 
of a defendant who represented himself at trial, despite his request that counsel be appointed. 
The court initially appointed counsel, but Pedockie decided to hire his own attorney when 
the public defender refused to pursue "frivolous" motions Pedockie wanted filed. Pedockie, 
2006 UT 28 at Tfif 6, 7, 10, 11. Trial was continued several times to give Pedockie time to 
hire an attorney. When Pedockie was unable to find an attorney who would file his motions, 
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he requested that the court appoint counsel. Id. at |13 . The trial court agreed to appoint 
counsel, but later informed the defendant that he would only appoint stand-by counsel. 
Pedockie protested, reiterating his desire for counsel. The court "scolded" Pedockie, noting 
that the defendant's attorneys "'always asked to be recused because you want them to do 
something that's illegal that's a violation of the Canons of Ethics.'" Id. at f 16. 
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that Pedockie's actions did not 
constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. First, the court found that the trial court had failed 
to explicitly inform Pedockie that his unwillingness to follow the advice of his attorneys 
would result in waiver of the right to counsel. "It is particularly troubling that, after agreeing 
to appoint counsel on July 31, the trial judge never warned Pedockie of the conduct that 
would give rise to an implied waiver of his right to appointed counsel but nevertheless 
imposed such a waiver sometime between the July 31 and August 13 hearings when 
Pedockie does not appear to have engaged in any objectionable conduct." Id. at f 49. 
Second, the court determined that any waiver could not have been knowing and intelligent 
because there was nothing in the record to indicate Pedockie understood the consequences of 
the decision to represent himself and that he would be expected to comply with the technical 
rules of procedure and evidence. Id. at *|f 50. 
Similarly, in Houston, this Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who 
represented himself at trial, after the trial court declined to review an incomplete affidavit of 
indigency requesting appointed counsel the day before the trial was scheduled to begin. 
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Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ^ 3, 10-11. Houston had previously retained two private 
attorneys. Id. at f 2. The first withdrew the day the first trial was scheduled when Houston 
declined to enter a plea; the second withdrew when Houston failed to stay in contact or pay a 
retainer fee. Id. The trial court declined to appoint counsel because Houston had retained 
counsel previously and was working full time and did not qualify for public assistance. Id. 
The trial court scheduled a status conference a week before trial was scheduled to discuss 
Houston's progress in obtaining counsel. Id. Houston informed the court he still had not 
obtained counsel, the court stated that trial would go forward as scheduled even if the 
defendant had not yet retained counsel. Id. When Houston filed the late and incomplete 
affidavit of indigency and appeared at trial without an attorney, the trial proceeded. Id. He 
was convicted of all counts of possessing a precursor chemical. Id. 
This Court concluded that Houston not voluntarily waived the right to counsel. Id. at 
If 10. "We conclude that although the record indicates that the trial judge urged Defendant on 
at least two occasions—at the pretrial hearing on January 4,2005, and again on January 19, 
2005--to immediately obtain counsel or submit an affidavit of indigency, he did not 
explicitly advise Defendant that his failure to do both would result in pro se representation." 
Id. The Court stated that, despite a lack of transcripts of proceedings below, it was 
convinced the trial judge had failed to ensure Houston understood the "pitfalls" of self-
representation. Id. 
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Based on the foregoing authority, it is that clear defendant here implicitly waived his 
right to an attorney by his conduct. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 at fflj 45-51. Defendant's 
waiver was voluntary because the trial court explicitly and unequivocally warned him that he 
must hire an attorney to represent him at the July 8, 2005, restitution hearing. R. 410:2-3. 
The court was equally clear in informing defendant that if he appeared at the restitution 
hearing without counsel, the hearing would still go forward and defendant would have to 
proceedpro se. R. 410:1 -2. Finally, the trial court told defendant to contact the court before 
the July 8 hearing if he was unable to procure counsel and the court would consider 
appointing counsel. Id Per Pedockie, defendant had clearly "been warned that continuation 
of the unacceptable conduct w[ould] result in a waiver of the right to counsel." Id. at ^ 33. 
Unlike the defendant in Houston, the trial court even offered to appoint counsel if he was 
unable to retain a private attorney. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, f^ 10.. 
Moreover, the trial court had good reason to trust that defendant would follow through 
on his commitment to retain counsel for the hearing. Unlike the Houston defendant, 
defendant never, at any time, requested appointed counsel. See id. at fflf 2, 3. Indeed, he 
demonstrated an ability to retain counsel to represent him. Attorney Larry Long represented 
defendant throughout the case, including the change-of-plea hearing, sentencing and even at 
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the first scheduled restitution hearing on March 7,2005.6 When Long finally withdrew and 
defendant appeared by himself at the second scheduled restitution hearing on June 17,2005, 
he informed the court that he had retained attorney Ed Brass, but that he needed a 
continuance because "counsel was newly retained, and therefore, could not be present 
today." R. 344; 410:1.7 Despite these assurances, defendant appeared without counsel at the 
restitution hearing. He also failed to notify the court beforehand as he had been instructed to 
do if he was unable to retain Mr. Brass. In short, defendant's "ability to pay for counsel plus 
refusal to do so . . . waive[d] the right to counsel at trial." Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695. 
Finally, defendant's implicit waiver was knowing and intelligent. Under Pedockie, 
before a court may find a waiver by conduct, "the defendant must have also possessed an 
awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied 
waiver." 2006 UT 28, f^ 33. There is no record of an explicit colloquy in which defendant 
acknowledges that he understands "'the consequences of the decision to represent himself, 
Even after he had officially withdrawn, R. 72, Long continued to represent 
defendant, appearing in court and drafting pleadings. R. 78-84,114-26,199-285. Long was 
still representing defendant on April 14, 2005, when the State filed a motion for restitution, 
which included most of Rebecca Mecham's bills for medical treatment—the same 
documentation introduced at the July 8,2005, restitution hearing. R. 410; 372. Long filed a 
second motion to withdraw, along with a document purporting to terminate his 
representation of defendant, on May 25, 2005, but then filed additional pleadings the 
following day. R. 216; 221. As late as May 31, 2005, the trial court was still addressing 
correspondence to Long as counsel for defendant. R. 342. 
7
 This statement was presumably true given that Mr. Brass represented defendant in a 
post-sentencing order-to-show-cause hearing and is currently representing him on appeal. 
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including the expectation that [he would need to] comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story."' Id. at f 50 
(citation omitted). Nonetheless, a review of the record establishes a knowing and intelligent 
waiver. First, unlike the defendants in Pedockie, Houston and virtually every other case 
concerning implied waiver, defendant demonstrated an appreciation for the importance of 
counsel by retaining an attorney at all times prior to the restitution hearing and then again 
immediately afterward. A defendant who did not understand the value of legal 
representation would not have retained private counsel at virtually every stage of the 
prosecution. Second, in contrast to cases like Houston and Pedockie in which the defendant 
represents himself at trial and must adhere to strict rules of evidence and procedure, 
defendant appeared pro se at a hearing in which the evidentiary and procedural rules are 
inapplicable. See, e.g., State v. Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2002) (rules of evidence in 
general, and the rules on hearsay exclusions in particular, inapplicable in restitution hearing). 
Because of the relaxed procedure at the restitution hearing, the court allowed defendant's 
wife, a registered nurse, to speak for him and urge the trial court not to impose the full 
amount of restitution because she and her husband were unable to pay it. By statute, the 
defendant's ability to pay is a relevant factor in imposing restitution and defendant's wife's 
appeals were apparently somewhat effective because the court imposed only half of the 
victim's actual losses. 
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Because defendant failed to take any action after being given an explicit deadline to 
do so, "the court may treat his failure to provide for his own defense as a waiver of his right 
to counsel and require such defendant to proceed to [the hearing] without an attorney." 
Arlen, 252 F.2d at 494. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT RECORD DEMONSTRATES 
DEFENDANT CAUSED THE ACCIDENT BY NEGLIGENTLY 
DRIVING DRUNK ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD; 
THUS, DEFENDANT'S VICTIM CANNOT BE FOUND 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
Defendant claims that the restitution award was improper because the victim, Rebecca 
Mecham, could not "recover pecuniary damages in a civil suit." Aplt. Br. at 15. Defendant 
claims that the court erred in imposing restitution because the victim could be found 
contributorily negligent for the injuries she suffered when defendant's vehicle swerved to the 
wrong side of the road and slammed into her parked car. Aplt. Br. at 11. 
This claim fails, first, because it is unpreserved and, second, because there is no 
evidence the victim was at all to blame for the injuries that have cost her more than $200,000 
in medical treatment and rehabilitation, as well as the loss of her home, income and future 
earnings. 
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A. Defendant's Claim that His Victim was Contributorily Negligent 
and Should Be Required to Pay a Portion of her Medical Costs 
Resulting from the Accident Was Not Raised Below and, 
Therefore, Should Not Be Considered. 
Defendant claims, cursorily, that even though he failed to raise his contributory 
negligence claim before the trial court, this Court should still consider it under the doctrines 
of plain error or exceptional circumstances or ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 
14-17. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some form 
of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before 
an appellate court will review such claim[s].'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis omitted); see 
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection below must be 
"'specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error... complained o f " Tolman 
v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Beehive 
Medical Elecs.} Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)). In other words, "the 
issue must be 'sufficiently raised to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court and must 
be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 
P.3d 276 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, f 19, 58 P.3d 879). This rule "applies 
to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist 
or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, *[f 11; see also State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 
1, Tf 41,63 P.3d 731 ("We have often stated that issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for 
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the first time on appeal... unless the petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error5 occurred or 
'exceptional circumstances' exist.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant].5" 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 16, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993)). An error is plain or obvious if "the trial court should have been 
aware that an error was being committed at the time.55 State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,122 n. 11 
(Utah 1989). This requires that "the law governing the error [be] clear at the time the alleged 
error was made.55 Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 16; see also State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35-36 
(Utah 1989) (rejecting a claim of plain error where a dispositive appellate case had not yet 
been decided). Plain error requires both obviousness and prejudice. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 15. 
It was defendant's burden to establish that an error occurred and that the error was 
prejudicial. Id. at ffif 22-23; see also United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 
1997) ("Croft did not show the lack of extra funds unduly hampered her defense or denied 
her effective assistance of counsel"); State v. Cote, 492 P.2d 986, 987 (Utah 1972) (trial 
court's denial of the "defendant's application for appointment of an investigator a,t public 
expense was not prejudicial to the rights of the defendant."). 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error. It is axiomatic that an error cannot 
be obvious if the court must adopt a new rule of law to find the error. "[A] trial court's error 
26 
is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997); accordEldr'edge, 773 P.2d at 35-36. There are no cases in 
Utah in which a court has allocated fault to the victim of a drunk driver in a criminal 
restitution hearing. Indeed, there are virtually no cases in any jurisdiction upholding or even 
discussing allocation of fault to a victim of a drunk driver for restitution purposes. Thus, if 
this Court were to find that the trial court should have apportioned some responsibility for 
the accident to the victim, it would be a new rule of law and, thus, the trial court's failure to 
do so cannot be obvious or plain error. 
For much the same reason, defendant cannot succeed in his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel against attorney Larry Long. According to this claim, Long, instead of 
arguing that the restitution award was discharged in bankruptcy—an argument that, at one 
point, appeared to be a winner—should have been pursuing the novel argument that fault 
should be allocated to defendant's victim. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must establish that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the 
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984). To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. To establish that such serious errors occurred, he must identify counsel's 
specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
See discussion below in section II.B. 
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assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Defendant must demonstrate '"that counsel's actions were not 
conscious trial strategy/" and "that there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for 
counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627,635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah. App. 1992)) (additional citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). He must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy," State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). '"[P]roof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.'" 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
To meet his burden under the second, prejudice prong of the Strickland test, defendant 
must show that he was actually harmed by any alleged deficiencies. To meet this criterion, 
defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). The courts have defined a reasonable 
probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694. 
Long cannot be constitutionally ineffective for not meeting a professional standard 
based on a rule of law or legal strategy that did not exist at the time. See, e.g., Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1228 ("To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misleading 
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of law, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect 
at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient. ")(emphasis added). 
As noted above, if this Court held that a drunk driver's victims must be apportioned a share 
of responsibility for injuries suffered in an accident, such a holding would be a new rule of 
law. Accordingly, defendant's counsel cannot be faulted for not making an argument based 
on a rule of law that did not exist at the time. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Restitution for the Victim's 
Medical Expenses, Lost Income and Any Other Costs Resulting 
From Defendant's Negligent Operation a Motor Vehicle While 
Intoxicated. 
Defendant's claims the trial court erred in imposing restitution because the judge did 
not consider the victim's possible role in causing the accident and apportion restitution 
proportionately. Defendant points out that he "told the presentence investigator that [the 
victim] drove her car into the flow of oncoming traffic and struck his car, and that she was 
negligent." Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing PSR at 2, 4). 
If the Court considers this unpreserved claim, it still fails, first, because it is unclear 
whether fault may be apportioned to the victim of a drunk driver for restitution purposes and, 
second, because there is no credible evidence the victim was in any way responsible for the 
accident that left her unconscious and seriously injured. 
Under Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act, "[wjhen a defendant is convicted of 
criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime..." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West 2004); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) 
(West 2004) (restitution statute). The act "imposes[s] a nondiscretionary duty upon [the 
court] to order [the defendant] to make appropriate restitution." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 
918, 922 (Utah App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 
127 P.3d 682. "Pecuniary damages" are "all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not 
yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and 
medical expenses " Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6) (West 2004). 
The damages a party may recover in a civil suit for negligence are determined by 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (West 2005 Supp.). 
Under the statute, "[t]he fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by 
that person." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(1). The statute further states: "The fact finder 
may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, . . . for whom there is a 
factual and legal basis to allocate fault." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(4)(a). 
Defendant claims that the trial court, in imposing restitution, should have applied 
Utah's comparative negligence principles to allocate some-or perhaps all—of the fault to the 
victim for her alleged negligence. Defendant relies principally on State v. Robinson, 860 
P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993), a case in which this Court voided a restitution award 
30 
because the trial court did not account for the negligence of all parties in a traffic accident. 
Robinson pleaded guilty to charges that he made an improper lane change and struck a 
motorcycle, injuring the two riders. Id. The court imposed $13,567.80 in restitution, 
representing the cost of the medical bills of both motorcyclists. Id. This Court held that the 
restitution award violated Robinson's due process rights because he had never been given an 
opportunity to contest the award and the trial court had failed to consider whether the 
defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the victims' injuries. Id. at 983. 
Defendant claims that his victim, like Robinson's, was partly to blame for the accident 
because she allegedly "drove her car into the flow of oncoming traffic and struck his car." 
Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing R. 372, PSR at 2,4). Thus, defendant claims he, like Robinson, should 
not be responsible for all of his victim's injuries. "Given the opportunity to do so in a civil 
suit, [defendant] might well be able to establish contributory negligence or intervening cause, 
or might successfully challenge the amount of damages, to limit or wholly preclude recovery 
from him." Id. 
However, no court in Utah, or virtually anywhere else, has apportioned fault to the 
victim of a drunk driver for restitution purposes. Indeed, after extensive research, the State 
found only a single case. See People v. Crossley, 512 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 
1987) (victim 25 percent responsible for two-car collision with drunk driver). Even in the 
civil context, few courts have apportioned fault to plaintiffs who were injured by drunk 
drivers in two-car collisions. But see Reed v. City of Syracuse, 309 A.D.2d 1195,1197 (N.Y. 
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App. Div. 2003) (drunkenness of driver who collided with another car after proceeding into 
intersection with green light may only be considered to determine if he was negligent).9 
However, this Court need not decide whether Utah should allow comparative fault in 
the present case because there is no credible evidence that the victim was in any way to 
blame for the accident that left her severely injured. Here, Rebecca Mecham, the victim, 
provided unrebutted testimony that defendant was the sole cause of the accident. She stated 
that she was at a stop sign that required her to turn west or east. R. 410:5. She noticed cars 
coming both directions, eastbound and westbound, but judged that she had enough time to 
make her left hand turn. R. 410:5-6. As she completed the turn, she saw defendant's car 
abruptly veer into her lane in an attempt to pass the eastbound vehicle. R. 410:6. To avoid 
More often, the question of whether drunk drivers may allocate fault to others is 
considered in lawsuits against the provider of the alcohol, e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997) (plaintiff injured by drunk driver may claim 
contributory negligence under "Dramshop Act," which imposes potential liability on any 
person who provided liquor); Booker, Inc. v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. App. 1994) 
(bartender liable), or cases in which defendants claim a plaintiff/passenger was contributorily 
negligent for getting into the car with a drunk driver. Wark v. McClellan, 68 P.3d 574, 581 
(Colo.App. 2003) (comparative negligence instruction appropriate based on claim that 
parents were negligent in allowing themselves and daughters into vehicle with alcohol-
impaired driver). There are also cases in which the state was deemed negligent by failing to 
remove double line from center of dead-end segment on which a drunk driver died, 
Humphrey v. State, 457 N.E.2d 767,768 (N. Y. 1983) (state 60 percent negligent), and where 
the state improperly reinforced a guard rail, which was largely the reason for another drunk 
driver's death. Clark v. State, 124 A.D.2d 879, 881 (N.Y. 1986) (claimant is 60 percent 
negligent for veering off the road while drunk, while state is 40 percent negligent in 
fabrication of guardrail). 
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defendant's vehicle, she turned onto the right shoulder and had completely stopped when 
defendant's car, traveling "at a high rate of speed," struck her, causing her car to roll. Id.; R. 
3. 
Thus, defendant's belated claim that the victim negligently swerved into his lane is 
completely contradicted by the record. In addition to having a blood alcohol level of. 16 and 
admitting at the accident scene that he had been drinking "a lot," defendant was cited for 
driving left of the centerline. R. 2. Although that charge was dismissed in a plea bargain, 
the victim's testimony as well as the Information's probable cause statement indicate 
defendant was driving on the wrong side of the road. R. 3; 410:6. Additionally, the class A 
misdemeanor DUI to which defendant pleaded guilty would been without factual support if 
defendant had not driven on the wrong side of the road because the statute required a 
showing of negligence on the part of the driver. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(A) 
(West 2004).10 In other words, if defendant had been driving on the right side of the road, 
the record would not have supported a charge that he had "operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner." Id. Rather, he would only have been guilty of simple DUI, a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44(3)(a)(i) (West 2004).11 
In short, there was no credible evidence in the record to suggest the victim was in any 
way to blame for the accident. If such evidence existed, defendant or his counsel had many 
10
 Renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(l)(b)(i)(West Supp. 2005). 
11
 Renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503(l)(a) (West Supp. 2005). 
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opportunities throughout the case to present it. Defendant never asked the court to allocate 
fault between him and the victim, even though the trial court would have been required to 
make such an allocation if requested. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(1) ("The fact finder 
may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, ). Defendant's counsel 
had many opportunities to make such a request, but chose instead to focus on the argument 
that the restitution was dischargeable in bankruptcy. See R. 78-84; see also section III, 
below. And while defendant was not represented at the restitution hearing, he was given the 
opportunity to tell the court what he told the presentence investigator—that he believed the 
victim was negligent and at least partially responsible for the accident. Instead, defendant 
attempted to cast himself as a victim and argued, persuasively as it turned out, that he and his 
wife could not afford to pay complete restitution. 
Absent any evidence of fault other than that of defendant—and absent any request 
from the defendant for a comparative fault determination—the trial court had no reason not 
to allocate fault solely to defendant and to order restitution accordingly. 
Although defendant failed to request a comparative fault allocation, the court, in 
considering defendant's financial resources, ultimately held him accountable for $102,000, 
which is only half of Rebecca Mecham's actual expenses. Thus, even if the court had 
allocated fault between defendant and Mecham, it is unlikely the result could have been 
much more favorable for defendant. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED RESTITUTION 
BECAUSE RESTITUTION IS PENAL, REPRESENTS AN 
OBLIGATION TO THE STATE, NOT THE VICTIM, AND IS, 
THEREFORE, NON-DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY 
UNDER FEDERAL LAW. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in awarding restitution because the bankruptcy 
court discharged the debt. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. This claim fails because the restitution award is 
specifically exempted from discharge by at least two provisions of the bankruptcy code. 
A bankruptcy court may discharge a debtor from all debts that arose before the 
signing of the discharge order "except as provided in section 523 of this title . . . " 11 
U.S.C.A. § 727(b). Under section 523, bankruptcy does not discharge a debt "for death or 
personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle... if such operation was 
unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another 
substance." 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9). Section 523 also presumes a debt is nondischargeable 
"to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, . . . . " 11 U.S.C 
523(a)(7). 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted section 523 to preclude the 
discharge of court-ordered restitution in criminal cases. "[W]e hold that §523(a)(7) 
preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal 
sentence." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986). Defendant ignores this controlling 
case. And while the Utah bankruptcy court briefly put forward a contrary view, the United 
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States Court for the District of Utah reversed, reaffirming that restitution is exempt from 
discharge. In re Troff, 329 B.R. 85 (D. Utah 2005) (Jenkins, J). According to the federal 
court, restitution 
serves important penological and rehabilitative goals entirely apart from an 
effort to compensate for pecuniary loss. Where a restitution obligation is 
imposed as part of a criminal sentence, the defendant must bear direct—and 
inescapable—personal responsibility for the harmful consequences of his or 
her criminal conduct. The message of personal accountability is the same 
message, whether the victims of the defendant's criminal conduct are few or 
many, governmental or private, known or unknown. 
Id. at 99. 
Clearly, the trial judge in this case carefully considered the dischargeability issue, 
even changing his mind twice before ultimately concluding that the restitution award was 
proper. Based on controlling United States Supreme Court precedent and the federal district 
court for Utah's decision in Troff, the Utah trial court was correct in imposing restitution on 
defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's restitution award.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of October, 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETfTDELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7th I hereby certify that on the 27 day of October, 20061 caused to be U.S. Mail two copies of 
the foregoing to: 
Edward K. Brass 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & 
Annos) 
Part 3. Restitution Requirements 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to 
any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which 
the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a 
victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-
102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary 
to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the 
defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution 
the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at 
the time of sentencing or within one year after 
sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution 
shall be determined as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision part of the 
court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, 
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall 
allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for 
an offense, the offense shall include any criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay 
restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as 
an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed 
by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of 
the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
method of healing recognized by the law of the place 
of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational 
therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the 
offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a 
victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's 
determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or 
damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that 
were owned by the victim and were essential to the 
victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related 
services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court 
shall consider the factors listed in Subsections 
(5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution 
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of 
the payment of restitution and the method of payment; 
and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines 
may make restitution inappropriate, 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii), 
the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if 
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been 
determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons 
and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one 
year after sentencing, refer an order of judgment and 
commitment back to the court for determination of 
restitution. 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78. Judicial Code 
Part III. Procedure 
*1 Chapter 27. Miscellaneous Provisions (Refs & 
Annos) 
-f§ 78-27-38. Comparative negligence 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not 
alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined 
with the fault of persons immune from suit and 
nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the 
fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any 
reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-27-
39(2) . 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-
21-
(4) (a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a 
party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to 
each defendant, to any person immune from suit, and to 
any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-
41(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to 
allocate fault. In the case of a motor vehicle 
accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle, the 
existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence which may consist solely of one 
person1s testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit 
is considered only to accurately determine the fault 
of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and may 
not subject the person immune from suit to any 
liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this 
or any other action. 
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lure ] 
JASON DEREK TROFF, 
Debtor* ] 
JASON DEREK TROTB> an individual, 
Plaintiff; ] 
vs. ) 
STATE OF UTAH, CAMELLE ANTHONY, ] 
in her official capacity as Executive Director ] 
of the Utah Dep&tasnt of Administrative ] 
Services, and GWEN ANDEBSON, in her ] 
official edacity as Director of the Office of 
. State Debt CoUection 
Defendants. 
I Bankruptcy Case No. 03-21WOGEC 
1 (Chaptcr7) 
I ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR'S 
) MOTION FOR PARTIAL * 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
• AND DENYING DEFENDANTS 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
\ JUDGMENT 
i .Adversely Proceeding No. 04-2491 
On March \ 2005, at 2:00 p.m*, the Court heard oral argument on the Debtor's Motion 
foT Partial Summary Judgment and the Stale of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment Michael 
Thompson'appeared on behalf of the Debtor, Jason Derek troJ^CDebtar^ and Kevin V. Olsen 
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appeared on behalf of the State of Utah* Cacrrille Anthony, and Gwcn Anderson, hereinafter 
collectively referred to as (the "State"). After considering argument of counsel and the pleadings 
before it, the Court now issues the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment. 
FINDfflOgOFyACT, 
1. The Debtor is a debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy* 
2. In August 1997, a judgment sentence was entered, in Third Judicial District .Cnnrt 
ordering Debtor to pay restitution to the State in the amount of $239^69.' 
3. The sentence was entered in conjunction with Debtor's criminal sentence. 
4. In October 200!, the Third District Court tatninated Debtor's remaning probation and 
turned the restitution portion of the criminal sentence over to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
5. The Court finds the issue of whether or not the restitution was "converted* to a civil 
judgment to be irrelevant to its analysis, and for purposes of this analysis, will assume 
that at all times, the restitution judgment remained criminal in nature. 
6. The restitution payments roade by the Debtor have been tamed over to the victim of the 
crime. 
7» DebtorpropcTly listed the State of Utah in his schedules and statement" and there is no 
dispute that the State received notice- of the Debtor's bankruptcy. 
8. Debtor was granted a Chapter 7 discharge. 
9. The State has continued to attempt collection of Ac restitution judgment 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Court adopts the reasoning set forth in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals* 
opinion of In re Towers. 162 F.3d 952 (1999) wherein the Circuit analyzed the provisions of 
§ 523(a)(7) to name three elements that must be met in older to except a restitution debt from 
discharge. The three elements arc, that the debt must reflect: 1) a fine, penalty or forfeiture; 2) 
payable to and for the benefit of a. governmental unit; 3) that it is aot compensation for actual 
pecuniary loss* It is undisputed by the parties thai the restitution order was in the form of a fine 
or penalty and thereby satisfies the first element of § 523(a)(7). The Undisputed fecta as they 
apply to the second and third elements of § 523(a)(73 arc analyzed as follows. 
The Restitution must be paid to andjfor the Benefit of a Governmental Unit 
The court finds that the second element of § 523(aX7) requires restitution to be both 
1) payable to & governmental unit a&d 2) for the benefit of a governmental unit It is not 
sufficient thai a restitution payment simply be made to the governmental unit Had Congress 
required only that restitution be payable to a governmental unit, this ruling would be easy and me 
State would prevail on this issue. The problem is that Congress imposed both requirements, the 
second of which requires dial a restitution payment benefit flic governmental unit 
. The State relies heavily upon the analysis found in Kellv v. Robinson 479 U.S. 36 (1986), 
which discusses the issue of'"benefit of a governmental unit" in dicta, Kelly v. Robinson is 
distinguishable. The victim in Kcllv vT Robinso^ was a governmental unit entitled to keep the 
restitution payment and thereby benefit directly from receipt of the restitution payment Here, the 
State concedes thai restitution payments are not kept by the State, They are forwarded by the 
04-2491 3. 
State to the victim. 
Payments benefit an entity when that entity gets to keep the money. A payment benefits a 
governmental unit when the payment goes into the governmental unit's coffers'and stays there. 
Were the Court to determine that the State benefits from restitution paymmts forwarded the 
victim, it would be hard to imagine any circumstance where the State would not benefit from 
restitution payments. Such an interpretation would effectively "Sprite out" the benefit 
requirement placed in § 523(a)(7) by Congress, 
The words of the statute require that a governmental unit benefit from the payment. The 
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the Hteral 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its 
drafters. y,S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, fac^ 489 U.S. 235, 242,109 S. Q, 1026,1031(1989). 
There is nothing demonstrably at odds with interpreting the intention of Congress to require.that 
a governmental unit to both take receipt of a payment, and Tceep it in order for fee stream of 
payments to be excepted from discharge. The Bankruptcy Code has many provisions that favor 
and prioritize the government's interests over other creditors. Such a provision is not at odds 
with fee intent of Congress, in fact it is in harmony with the consistent intent of Congress to 
favor the government over other creditors. 
Because the victim, and not the State benefits from payment of Debtor's restitution, tho 
restitution here is not excepted from discharge tinder the second element of § 523(aX7>* 
*n>e Restitution Must Not Compensate for Actual Pecuniary Loss 
Addressing the third element of § 523(aX7)> thai the restitution nut be in compensation 
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for actual pecuniary loss, the Court must lookto the nature of the restitution-payment to 
determine whether or not it compensates for actual pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court of Utah 
in Monscm v. Carver. 928 P-2d 1017,1027 (1996), stales that • 
[I}t is clear from the legislative scheme that restitution is not a 'punishmeat' but a 
civil penalty whose purpose is entirely remedial, i.e., to compensate victims for 
the harm caused by a defendant and whose likely intent is to spars vicrims the 
time, expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover 
tbeir damages from the defendant 
In addition, Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-20 t(lXc) Emits restitution to an amount which 
is necessary to compensate a victim for losses's caused by the defendant A penalty assessed to 
de&ay costs is not excluded than discharge by §523(aX7). Williams v> Motley, 925 R2d 741t . 
745 (4th Cir. 1991). Because Utah law defines restitution as being compensatory in nature and 
not as praishment Debtor's restitution is not excepted from discharge under the third dement of 
§ 523(aX7). The Court does not now decide, because the question is not before it, the issue of 
whether or not restitution payments made during an ongoing period of probation would bo 
excepted ik>m discharge under § 523(aX7)-
Section 523/aXTi is Not the Appropriate Remedy 
Here, the court has before it a debtor who pled guilty to the crime of anon. Congress 
dealt with claims such as lids by enacting Code § 523(aX6) which exempts debts that stem from 
willful and malicious sqjnry by "die dffotor xo another entity or lo the property of another entity. 
The underlying facts of the Debtor's action* appear to "fit" the provisions of § 523(a)(6). There 
is no reason to treat a victim of a willful and malicious injury that is benefitted by a criminal 
restitution order any differently than any other victim of a willful and malicious iiijuiy, nnless 
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1) fee restitution. L5 * &*£> penalty or forfeitxire; 2) that is payable to and benefits a governmental 
unit and 3) the restitution is not cxrmpcnsaticm for actual pecuniary loss. The facts before the 
Court today do no* fit the requirements set forth under § 523(a)(7), 
TheXutonaft'c Stav Was Not Knowing?v Violated 
Because th^ is an issue of first impression within this Circuit, the Stale did not 
knowingly violate &e automatic stay and the Court wiD award no damages in favor of the Debtor 
with respect to an/ Violation of the automatic stay. 
Based upoA the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* it is hereby. 
ORDEREP that the Debtor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is hereby granted, 
and it is further, 
ORDEREP that the State's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and it is further; 
ORDEREP thai Debtor is awarded no damages as a Tesult of any violation of the 
automatic stay. 
£, DATED this /> • day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
GLENE. ClARK, CHffiF JUDGE 
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Addendum C 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 I 2005 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT ^?*o l^J}mVj 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA&—™ ' ^ T ^ u t y cierk 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
vs. ORDER ON RESTITUTION 
NICHOLAS CABRERA, 
Case No. 051903850 
Defendant. Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The Defendant in this matter was initially charged with two third-degree felonies (two 
counts of driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in serious bodily injuries). He was also 
charged with a Class B misdemeanor (no insurance), and two Class C misdemeanors (crossing 
the center line and no driver's license). 
The Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement, settling the matter and avoiding a 
jury trial on the original charges. The plea agreement required the Defendant to plead guilty to 
two Class A misdemeanors (driving under the influence of alcohol with resulting injuries) and 
one Class B misdemeanor (no insurance). In accord with the agreement, the Defendant pled 
guilty to the two Class A misdemeanors and one Class B misdemeanor. It was alleged that the 
Defendant had driven his vehicle head-on into the vehicle of Rebecca Mecham. Defendant, Ms. 
Mecham, and her step-daughter, Amber, were all severely injured in the collision. 
The matter was set for sentencing on December 13, 2004, before Judge Stephen Roth. At 
1 
that time, the Court imposed jail, fine, and probation, including a condition that Defendant pay 
restitution in the initially-determined amount of $80,000 to Rebecca Mecham1 (one of the 
victims), said amount to be paid in installments equal to one-half of the Defendant's income. 
The exact amount of restitution was to be determined at a restitution hearing which was 
scheduled to occur on March 7, 2005. 
On March 7, 2005, Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to any restitution. The 
State replied in support of its claim that restitution be paid. In essence, the Defendant argued 
that he had been adjudicated bankrupt with all debts discharged in May of 2004. He further 
contended that the victims had received $25,000 each from an uninsured motorist policy, and that 
therefore, any restitution would constitute double payment. The State argued that a restitution 
obligation resulting from a DUI-with-injuries conviction was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
The State further contended that the insurance company was a "victim" and thereby entitled to 
restitution for payments made for losses stemming from the collision. Because the payments to 
the other victims had been deducted from the amounts of restitution claimed for them, the State 
maintained that there were no double payments being requested. 
On March 28, 2005, the Court (Judge John Paul Kennedy) initially indicated that the 
restitution obligation of the Defendant would not be deemed to have been discharged in 
bankruptcy and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. On the same day after the hearing, the 
Court received by fax Defendant's further memorandum in opposition to restitution. 
On April 14, 2005, the State file its proposed Motion for Restitution in the above matter. 
On April 19, 2005, the parties appeared at the evidentiary hearing. The Court, sua sponte, cited 
1
 This victim's prior surname was Desmarais. 
2 
to a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Hon. G. Clark), In the 
matter ofTroff, wherein a debtor's restitution obligation was held to be discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Based on that decision, the Court directed Defendant's counsel to 
prepare findings and conclusions supporting Defendant's contentions. 
The Defendant failed to prepare the requested papers, and on May 10, 2005, the State 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Court to distinguish the Trq^decision and hold 
the Defendant responsible for restitution in the amount claimed by the State. 
The Court set the matter for status review on May 20, 2005. On that date, the parties 
were present and Defendant informed the Court that a lengthy document had been filed a day or 
two before. Because this recent filing had not yet reached the Court's file, the matter was 
continued for further review and possible evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2005. Following the 
filing of Defendant's memorandum in opposition to the State's motion to reconsider the Court's 
ruling, Defendant's counsel submitted a motion to withdraw. On June 17, a hearing in this 
matter was held with the State ready to proceed with witness testimony, but Defendant had not 
obtained new counsel. Thus, the matter was continued until July 8, 2005, with the caveat to all 
parties that the matter would be heard at that date without further delay. 
On July 8, 2005, the State appeared at the hearing, again ready to proceed. Defendant 
appeared, but indicated for the first time to the Court that he had not been able to obtain counsel. 
The State expressed its desire to proceed under the circumstances and especially since 
Defendant had been previously advised that no further continuances would be granted. The State 
presented testimony and documentary evidence of Rebecca Mecham's financial losses. The State 
indicated that restitution claims based upon Amber Mecham's and Allied Insurance Company's 
losses were withdrawn. 
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Findings of Fact: 
1. On May 17, 2003, Defendant Nicholas Cabrera (herein, "the Defendant") was operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah law and resulting in 
bodily injuries to Rebecca Mecham and her step-daughter, Amber Mecham. 
2. On February 14, 2004, the Defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7, 
listing the individual victims and Allied Insurance Company as creditors, but not listing 
the State of Utah as a creditor. 
2. On April 19, 2004, an Information was filed, charging the Defendant with two 3d degree 
felonies (DUI with serious bodily injuries), one Class B misdemeanor (no insurance), and 
two Class C misdemeanors (crossing the center line and no driver's license). 
3. On May 19, 2004, the Defendant was determined to be bankrupt and his debts were 
discharged by the United States Bankruptcy Court (Hon. W. Thurman) for the District of 
Utah. 
4. On September 30, 2004, the Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement 
wherein the charges against the Defendant were amended. As a part of the settlement, the 
Defendant pled guilty to two Class A misdemeanors (DUI with injuries) and one Class B 
misdemeanor (no insurance). The remaining charges were dismissed. 
5. As a part of the agreement, the Defendant admitted: 
On or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I operated a 
motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol to a degree that I could not safely do 
so, injuring two people. 
The Defednant farther stated in the agreement: 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
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crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed 
as a part of the plea agreement. 
6. As a matter of practice, the Court uses restitution as one of many sentencing options to 
further the interests of the State of Utah. Restitution furthers the interest of the State in 
punishing and rehabilitating those who commit crimes. In such matters, the Court by 
statute considers the victims' claim for restitution, and gives great attention to the 
Defendant and his situation. As a part of sentencing, the Court considers the restitution 
requirement to be flexible and tailors restitution to the Defendant's situation. 
7. The victims in this matter under UCA 77-38a-102—302 are: 
a. Rebecca Mecham (currently 27 years old); 
b. Amber Mecham; and 
c. Allied Insurance, 
all of whom suffered pecuniary damages as a result of Defendant's violation of the law. 
Because the State withdrew the claim for restitution on behalf of Amber Mecham and 
Allied Insurance, no restitution is determined to be owing as a result of any losses 
suffered by those two victims. 
8. Based upon the evidence presented to the Court, the Court finds that the amount of 
economic loss suffered by the remaining victim, Rebecca Mecham, as a result of the 
offense is as follows: 
a. medical and hospital: $81,735.63, less payments of $3,000 and $25,000,2 or a net 
2
 At the hearing, there was an issue raised as to whether Rebecca Mecham received 
an insurance payment of $25,000, similar to the amount of a payment admittedly made by the 
insurance company to Amber. In a letter dated January 23, 2004, from Allied Insurance to 
Defendant's attorney (which letter is a part of the Court's file), Allied identified that two 
payments, each in the amount of $25,000, were in fact made—one to Amber and one to Rebecca. 
of $53,735.63, to-date. 
b. Loss of equity in home: $40,000.00 
c. Loss of value of personal property including repossessed vehicle: $30,000.00 
d. Loss of income to-date: (based upon prior earnings of $37,500.00 per year) 
$78,000.00. 
9. Complete restitution for each victim, based upon the evidence presented, is as follows: 
a. Rebecca Mecham: $201,735.63. Ms. Mecham continues to accumulate 
additional losses for medical expenses. Further, because she is unable to work 
due to her injuries, she continues and will continue to suffer lost income from now 
until her expected date of retirement (at age 65), a total of 37 years in an amount 
equal to $37,500.00 per year. It is possible that Ms. Mecham may avoid incurring 
some of these losses by declaring bankruptcy, but as of yet, she has not been 
adjudicated to be bankrupt. 
b. Amber Mecham: $0.00 
c. Allied Insurance: $0.00 
10. Court-ordered restitution for each victim based upon the evidence and taking into account 
the Defendant's and the victim Rebecca Mecham's personal situations: 
a. Rebecca Mecham: $102,000.00 
b. Amber Mecham: $0.00 
c. Allied Insurance: $0.00 
These two payments comprised part of the insurance company's initial claim of $62,837.06, 
which claim was withdrawn. 
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Conclusions of Law: 
A. Based upon the foregoing facts and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the 
obligation of the Defendant to make restitution payments was not discharged in 
bankruptcy. 
B. In this matter, it is contemplated that the restitution would be paid to Adult Probation and 
Parole, an agency of the State of Utah, for deposit into the Victims' Impact Fund, an 
account of the State of Utah. 
C. In this matter, because the restitution issue was left open, the actual imposition of the 
sentence has not yet been completed until this order is entered. 
D. The restitution required in this matter (to the extent it does not exceed the pecuniary 
losses of the victims) is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and specifically, was not 
discharged in the Defendant's bankruptcy proceeding for the reasons stated below: 
(1) Because the restitution obligation stems from personal injuries which were 
incurred as a direct result of the Defendant's unlawful operation of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the obligation is excepted from 
discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(9). 
(2) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a plea agreement, which is a 
settlement agreement entered into by the Defendant, it is excepted from discharge 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(19)(ii). 
(3) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a court order for restitutionary 
payment, it is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 
523(a)(19)(iii). 
E. Because the order of restitution is excepted from discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding 
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as noted above, it is not necessary in this decision for this Court to determine whether the 
Court's initial ruling as to the applicability of the reasoning in the Tr off decision should 
be reconsidered. The debt here may be considered a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to 
and for the benefit of a governmental unit. Whether or not restitution is "compensation 
for actual pecuniary loss" (under the bankruptcy statutes), however, is not decided herein. 
And the question of whether the bankruptcy statutes implicitly require that to be an 
exception from discharge, the debt must be solely compensation for pecuniary loss is also 
not decided herein. In this instance, it should be noted, however, the Court would 
conclude that the restitution debt is not solely compensation for pecuniary loss. The 
benefit obtained by the State is also not merely a financial benefit, as noted above. 
In this case, the State certainly considers the interests of the victims; however, it cannot 
be said that the State represents the interest of the victims and certainly, in the bankruptcy 
action, it cannot be said that the interests of the State were represented by the victims. 
Because there was no notice to the State in the bankruptcy action, and perhaps for other 
valid legal reasons as well, the State was not and cannot be considered to have been a 
party to the bankruptcy proceeding and thus, the State is not bound by any rules of claim 
preclusion in this matter. 
The imposition of a restitution order by the Court in this matter does not constitute a "re-
trial" of the bankruptcy proceeding. This is true because: 
(1) As already noted, the State was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. 
(2) No issue regarding an obligation, which stems from a court order as a part of a 
sentence in a criminal conviction and requires restitution, was ever presented in 
the bankruptcy proceeding. 
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(3) Indeed, no such issue could have been raised because the Defendant was 
presumed to be innocent and no conviction was entered until months following 
the final adjudication in the bankruptcy court. 
(4) The Defendant agreed to be responsible for restitution as a part of a settlement 
plea agreement, which also post-dated the final adjudication in the bankruptcy 
court. 
I. It is therefore appropriate that the Court, as a part of the probation conditions of the 
Defendant's sentence, issue an order requiring the Defendant to make restitution 
payments to Adult Probation and Parole for transfer into the Victims' Impact Fund. 
J. The Court records the following reasons for imposing restitution in this matter: 
(1) The Defendant agreed to pay restitution as a part of his plea agreement. 
(2) The Court believes that payment of restitution in this matter will help the 
Defendant better understand the severity of the consequences of his actions. 
(3) The Court believes that by being required to pay restitution, the Defendant will be 
more effectively deterred from committing further crimes in the future. 
(4) The Court believes that for justice to be served in this matter, Defendant should be 
required to pay restitution in the amount and at the rate indicated herein. 
K. In determining the amount of Court-ordered restitution, the Court considered the 
pecuniary losses incurred by the victim Rebecca Mecham, including real and personal 
property losses, income losses, and medical and hospital expenses. 
L. In determining the amount of Court-ordered restitution, the Court also considered (1) the 
financial resources of the Defendant, who possesses little education and has earned only 
about $7.00 per hour, and the burden imposed upon the Defendant regarding his other 
9 
financial obligations; (2) the ability of the Defendant to make payments on an installment 
basis; (3) rehabilitative effect on the Defendant because of his being ordered to make the 
restitution payments; and (4) other circumstances including the fact that his wife earns 
only $7.75 per hour and that the couple, although young, has of yet no children. 
M. The Court concludes that the Defendant can and should make restitution payments on an 
installment basis in the amount of $500.00 per month, beginning not later than the 5th day 
of each month, commencing August 2005 and ending in July 2022. 
Order 
I. Commencing not later than August 5th, 2005, and continuing monthly thereafter until and 
including July 5th, 2022, the Defendant shall make restitution payments to the Utah 
State's Victims' Impact Fund in the monthly amount of $500.00. 
II. The office of the State's Victims' Impact Fund may recover said amounts from any 
payments due to Defendant and may garnish wages, bank accounts, tax refunds, or other 
assets to effect collection. 
III. If Defendant voluntarily permits the collection of said payments, no service charges or 
other fees shall be assessed. 
IV. Failure to make payments when due shall be considered cause for probation revocation or 
a contempt of court citation against the Defendant. 
V. This Order shall be deemed to be a final order. 
Dated: July 11, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
Johjh Paul Kennedy, Third District Judge 
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Jerry KENDALL, 
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On Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw 
as Counsel. Granted. 
On Defendant's Motion for Appointment of 
Private Counsel: Denied. 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, Deputy Attorney 
General, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington. 
Mr. Jerry Kendall, Sussex Work Release, 
Georgetown. 
Aaron R. Goldstein, Esquire, Assistant 
Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, 
Wilmington. 
*1 Dear Counsel and Mr. Kendall: 
[1] Mr. Goldstein filed a motion to withdraw 
as the public defender and counsel for Mr. 
Kendall in the above captioned-matter. The 
Public Defender argues that the Court's 
order of April 16, 1997 which appointed a 
public defender to represent Mr. Kendall 
regarding restitution issues goes beyond the 
statutory authority of 29 Del C. § 4602(a) 
and (b). Specifically, that statute declares 
that the Public Defender shall represent 
indigent defendants who are "under arrest" 
or "charged with a crime." The court 
determined that Mr. Kendall was indeed 
indigent; however, Mr. Kendall was 
sentenced in February 1997. Once 
sentenced, the defendant was no longer 
under arrest or charged with a crime, but 
convicted and serving the appropriate 
sentence for that conviction. To require the 
Public Defender to represent Mr. Kendall 
beyond sentencing in this case would be 
beyond the scope of the statute. 
Accordingly, the Court will rescind its April 
16, 1997 order appointing the Public 
Defender to represent the Defendant on the 
restitution issues in this case. 
[2] Mr. Kendall has subsequently filed a 
motion to have counsel appointed if the 
Court grants the Public Defender's motion, 
claiming defendant would be deprived of 
due process. The Supreme Court of 
Delaware has held that an indigent 
defendant shall not have an automatic right 
to counsel, but such a right shall be 
determined on "an individual case basis." 
Black v. Division of Child Support 
Enforcement, Del.Supr., 686 A.2d 164 
(1996). In Gaznon v. Scarpelll 411 U.S. 
778 (1973\ the Supreme Court declared that 
if the State seeks a punishment less than 
incarceration, the appointment of counsel 
may not be required. The Court must decide, 
however, whether the defendant should 
receive counsel as a matter of fundamental 
fairness. Black at 165. The Court should err 
on the side of the indigent, when such 
matters are difficult to determine. Id. In the 
case at hand, the defendant's liberty is not 
threatened. It was clear at the time of 
sentencing that restitution would be ordered, 
but that the amount of restitution would be 
determined at a later date. That later date has 
not yet happened, four years after the 
sentencing. Mr. Kendall has been 
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represented by Joseph Hurley, Esquire and 
by the Public Defender at various times 
since his sentencing, but motions filed by 
the defendant have procedurally delayed 
resolution of the amount he owes his 
victims. 
[3] This Court must determine whether 
defendant has a right to counsel for the sole 
purpose of representation at the restitution 
hearing. The outcome of that hearing will 
not deprive the defendant of any liberty 
interest. Upon conviction, the defendant was 
aware that he would be required to pay 
restitution. A further hearing on that matter 
merely clarifies an aspect of the sentencing. 
The hearing, itself, is not required by the 
Court, but has been so ordered to protect the 
defendant's right to present evidence as to 
what he owes. This court sees no issues of 
due process or fairness in relation to the 
defendant's lack of counsel at the hearing he 
is requesting. No counsel will be appointed. 
[4] *2 Therefore, the Public Defender's 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel is Granted 
and the Defendant's Motion for 
Appointment of Private Counsel is Denied. 
Commissioner Vavala shall begin the 
scheduling of a Restitution Hearing in this 
case between the Pro Se Defendant and the 
State. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Del.Super.,2001. 
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